

The President's Daily Brief

November 4, 1976

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LEBANON: President Sarkis is expected to unveil and explain the blueprint for implementation of the Riyadh agreement before the end of the week.

The original timetable drawn up at the Riyadh summit called for an expanded Arab League peace-keeping force to be assembled in Lebanon by tomorrow. The prolonged negotiations over how the forces should be deployed and the slow dispatch of additional peace-keeping troops will cause some delay.

Troop movements from Syria to Lebanon early this week apparently involved only Syrian forces. The Saudi and Sudanese contingents for the force have not yet arrived.

Unusually optimistic statements yesterday by both Phalanges leader Pierre Jumayyil and Christian extremist Camille Shamun on the prospects for peace suggest that some sort of plan to incorporate soldiers from the regular Lebanese army in the Leaque force has been adopted.

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A senior Syrian military officer yesterday acknowledged that some Palestinians were moving back into the Arqub and south Lebanon and that more would be going to these areas.

The officer implied that the Syrians were encouraging this movement and emphasized that the Cairo accords guarantee the Palestinians the right to operate from the Arqub. He stressed that because of the fall of several Palestinian camps many had no other place except the south to go.

There is no evidence yet that large numbers of Palestinians are moving

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southward. Some elements of the Palestine Liberation Army, which are thought to be under Syria's control, recently returned to southern Lebanon. It is possible that Syria intends to use these and its other Palestinian assets to help to control the activity of militant groups.

IRAQ-SYRIA: Iraq's closure of its border with Syria on Tuesday and the withdrawal of the Iraqi ambassador from Syria yesterday are the latest expressions of Baghdad's frustration over the Cairo summit's legitimization of Syria's role in Lebanon.

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timing of this activity could be a signal that Baghdad still is not prepared to accept, as have most other Arabs, Syria's dominant role in Lebanon.

There are signs, however, that the Iraqis are becoming uncomfortable with their isolated stance on Lebanon. An Iraqi broadcast on Tuesday, reporting a visit by an emissary of Lebanese President Sarkis, stressed that Iraq would work to restore peace in Lebanon and implied that it would contribute financially to Lebanon's reconstruction.

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ANGOLA: President Agostinho Neto is assuming the functions of prime minister, thereby officially taking on three roles -- those of head of government, chief of state, and leader of the party. The change was announced in a long statement issued by the ruling Popular Movement that also set forth a broadranging program for Angola's political and economic development, to be pursued within the context of "scientific socialism."

The new program and Neto's entrenchment as Angola's paramount political figure may have constituted a package put together to accommodate factional differences within the Popular Movement. Some elements of the program differ considerably from policies that Neto earlier espoused. Possibly also having a bearing on the changes are a Soviet-Angolan "friendship treaty" and a partyto-party agreement signed by Neto last month in Moscow.

Neto has previously been identified with efforts to broaden Angola's economic and political ties with the West and to follow a policy of nonalignment. Although the Popular Movement's statement includes references to such policies, it places heavy stress on Angola's special relations with Moscow and Hayana.

Until now, the Angolan government has appeared anxious to maintain access to Western markets and technology. The new program calls for strong state control over the economy through nationalization and centralized planning. Provision is made for a private sector, but one subject to strict controls.

The Popular Movement also approved a five-year plan for reorganizing and upgrading the country's armed forces. This will undoubtedly be carried out under Soviet and Cuban direction.

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
The Popular Movement's announcement is not likely to sit well with some of Angola's neighbors, who were upset by the Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty. 25X1 Zairian President Mobutu is likely to view Luanda's announcement as confirmation of his belief that Angola is a Soviet client. SAUDI ARABIA 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 --continued

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Italian Prime Minister Andreotti has offered to meet formally with the Communists on a bilateral basis.		This concession was in response to a Communist Party proposal that all non-government parties, except the neo-fascists, participate in formal consultations on government policies.				
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		The new arrangement allows the Communists to bring home a victory of sorts to their rank and file, who continue to question whether the party is getting enough in return for its present cooperation with the government. The concession is not likely to satisfy the Communists for long.				
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